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Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983,'
creates a cause of action in the federal courts, ostensibly for the full scope of
constitutional claims2 cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The
Supreme Court holds that § 1983 supports three types of claims4 under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that
the state shall not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without "due
process:" 5 procedural due process, which addresses the guarantee of proce-
dural fairness;6 violations of the specific guarantees found in the Bill of
Rights, as they are selectively incorporated for application to the states;7 and
claims brought under a "substantive" component of the clause that bars ar-
bitrary or wrongful abuses of government power.8 This Comment focuses
on the application of due process to redress arbitrary and capricious depriva-
tions of property interests.
Historically, state-effected deprivations of constitutionally-protected
"property rights"-those interests that rise to the level of a "legitimate claim
of entitlement" -tdgger inquiry into whether the state utilized constitu-
tionally adequate procedures to effect the deprivation.'° The Supreme Court
has usually held that "procedural" due process requires the state to afford
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
6. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125; see infra text accompanying notes 28-43.
7. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 55-65.
8. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 74-82.
9. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978), see infra notes 33-35
and accompanying text.
10. Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 1989).
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both notice and a hearing before depriving a person of a protected property
interest. 11
A major exception to the pre-deprivation procedure requirement arises
where the deprivation results from a "random and unauthorized act of a
state employee."' 2 When this occurs, the state cannot possibly predict such
an act, making the implementation of pre-deprivation safeguards impossi-
ble.13 In such situations, a meaningful post-deprivation remedy at state law
provides a § 1983 plaintiff with constitutionally adequate process.14 This ex-
ception is commonly known as the Parratt rule.'" Application of the Parratt
rule abrogates the procedural due process claim, because that claim is based
on a state's failure to provide constitutionally adequate process and not on
the erroneous deprivation of the protected property interest. 16
Due process violations, however, can also occur when an arbitrary or
wrongful deprivation occurs, regardless of the adequacy of the state's depri-
vation procedures. 17 The Supreme Court readily recognizes these "substan-
tive" due process challenges to statutory or regulatory schemes that affect
property rights.' In cases where a plaintiff merely challenges arbitrary offi-
cial conduct that effects a deprivation, however, the Court's opinions fail to
provide coherent guidelines for analysis of the claim at issue.19 Conse-
quently, the lower federal courts have little direct guidance on whether and
under what circumstances arbitrary and capricious deprivations of property
rights implicate due process concerns.20 The United States courts of ap-
peals, navigating through "an area of the law famous for its controversy, and
11. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979); Craft, 436 U.S. at 18; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 540-41 (1974).
12. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986) (overruling Parratt's application of § 1983 to negligent deprivations); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same).
13. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S 113, 129 (1990).
14. Id. at 128.
15. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
16. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has usually applied
substantive due process to property deprivations when reviewing challenges to the statutory
basis authorizing the state action. Id. For example, where the plaintiff challenges a zoning
ordinance, the Court will uphold the ordinance as a valid exercise of the state's police power
unless it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926).
19. Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining the
lack of Supreme Court guidance).
20. Id.
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not known for its simplicity,"'" are understandably split on the proper anal-
ysis, and disagree on the question of whether every property interest impli-
cates substantive due process protection against arbitrary deprivations.2 2
Some circuit courts dichotomize the treatment of property interests on the
basis of whether an interest is "fundamental," and refuse to recognize sub-
stantive due process protection for property interests that lack such "funda-
mental" import.2 3 Other circuit courts will recognize the claim, but differ
on the circumstances under which these claims are cognizable.2 4 As a result,
due process claims for arbitrary deprivations of property by a government
actor are cognizable only in selected forums. Thus, the Supreme Court
needs to provide a coherent analytical framework for this "substantive" as-
pect of due process.25
This Comment examines the circuit courts' development of differing ap-
proaches to the due process guarantee against arbitrary property depriva-
tions. The divergent analyses present two problematic questions: whether
substantive due process protects all property interests from arbitrary depri-
21. Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1987).
22. See Kauth, 852 F.2d at 957 (collecting cases).
23. See Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989), discussed infra notes 142-55 and
accompanying text; see also Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1990), discussed infra
notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
24. See Schaper, 813 F.2d at 709, discussed infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text; see
also Kauth, 852 F.2d at 951, discussed infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
25. "Substantive due process" is a problematic term because the Supreme Court has used
the term as a vehicle for protecting certain interests the Court deems "important," "fundamen-
tal," or pertaining to "liberty" by placing such interests in a "preferred position." See RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 269 (1977). For example, at the turn of the century,
the Court deemed "liberty of contract" important, and used the Due Process Clause to strike
down economic legislation. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 43-49
(1990). In the New Deal years 1934-1938, the Court repudiated this "economic due process"
doctrine, known derisively as "Lochnerizing" (derived from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)). BORK, supra, at 44, 57-58. The Court also uses "substantive
due process" when it applies to the states select, important guarantees found in the Bill of
Rights. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. In yet another sense, the Court uses
"substantive due process" to erect stringent barriers to the infringement of "fundamental"
personal interests the Court has elevated to a "preferred position." The privacy rights pro-
tected in the contraception and abortion cases illustrate this approach. See infra notes 66-73
and accompanying text.
The debate over the propriety of the Court's approach to "substantive due process" is exten-
sive. The Court's "preferred position" approach to constitutional interpretation is criticized
for failing to limit due process to the framers' intent-the so-called "original understanding."
See generally BORK, supra, at 143 (postulating that "only the approach of original understand-
ing.., is consonant with the design of the American Republic"). The liberal justification for
the Court's approach, as articulated by Justice Brennan, is that constitutional interpretation
should be sensitive "to both transformations of social condition and evolution of our concepts
of human dignity." Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).
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vation and, if so, under what circumstances. Particularly provocative is the
debate over whether the Parratt rule-a procedural due process doctrine-
bars substantive due process claims for arbitrary government action.
This Comment begins with a brief overview of the § 1983 claims available
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This section
describes the elements of "procedural" due process, focusing on the nature
of state-created property rights and the scope of the procedural protection
triggered by a state-effected deprivation of these rights. Next, this section
discusses the Parratt rule, the reasons for its adoption, and the present reach
of the rule. This section then provides a summary outline of the "substan-
tive" due process models. First, this discussion summarizes the component
of the Clause through which the Supreme Court has elevated certain impor-
tant interests to "fundamental" status, including certain guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights. Second, it introduces the Supreme Court precedent that
applies the "arbitrary and capricious" government action standard to depri-
vations of property.
This Comment next examines the differing approaches of the circuit
courts in cases of § 1983 claims for arbitrary and capricious deprivations of
property interests. Through a discussion of illustrative cases, this section
divides the circuit court treatment into three approaches: those circuit
courts which readily apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to property
deprivations; those circuit courts that refuse to apply substantive due process
to less-than-fundamental property interests; and those circuit court ap-
proaches holding that the Parratt rule can bar a due process claim for arbi-
trary action.
This Comment then attempts to square the differing circuit court ap-
proaches with the larger notion of due process. This Comment concludes
that the Due Process Clause protects all property interests from the arbi-
trary exercise of government power, despite the relative significance of the
interest. This Comment further concludes that the correct application of the
Parratt doctrine bars the substantive due process claim. Finally, this Com-
ment advocates the use of traditional procedural due process analysis to de-
termine the existence of a due process violation.
[Vol. 41:703
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I. DUE PROCESS PRIMER: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
The Supreme Court separates the Due Process Clause into three distinct
components with respect to § 1983 claims.2 6 Contemporary scholars often
attempt to integrate due process by focusing on inconsistencies in the defini-
tions of due process theory as they are applied across the three compo-
nents." Similarly, this Comment looks toward an integrated perspective of
Fourteenth Amendment due process, and seeks to reconcile apparently in-
consistent approaches to the guarantee of due process for the deprivation of
property. Thus, a brief overview of fairly settled due process jurisprudence
is a necessary foundation for this analysis.
A. Due Process as a Guarantee of Procedural Fairness
The "procedural" component of the Due Process Clause28 guarantees that
the state shall not deprive a person of property without "constitutionally
adequate" process.29 Where a plaintiff alleges a procedural due process vio-
lation premised on a deprivation of property, the court performs a two-pro-
nged test. The first inquiry is whether the state-created interest constitutes
"property" protected by the Clause.3" The second determination is whether
the state's deprivation procedure is "constitutionally adequate.",
31
Property interests are created and defined by non-constitutional, state-cre-
ated sources such as statutes, rules, and understandings. 32 The Supreme
26. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Due process also encompasses issues
outside of the scope of § 1983 such as personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
27. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1986); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Due Process, State
Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 KAN. L. REV. 217 (1985); Michael Wells and Thomas A.
Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201
(1984). These articles discuss due process and the Parratt rule from both procedural and sub-
stantive due process perspectives and seek to define Parratt-a procedural due process doc-
trine-in an attempt to examine its ramifications for substantive due process.
28. The "procedural" component is due process in its truest historical sense. Professor
Berger reported that "[i]t has been convincingly shown that due process was conceived in
utterly procedural terms, specifically, that a defendant must be afforded an opportunity to
answer by service of process in proper form, that is, in due course." BERGER, supra note 25, at
197.
29. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126.
30. Id. at 125.
31. Id. at 126.
32. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985). In Loudermill, the
Court recognized that Ohio Civil Service employees had a property interest in continued em-
ployment where the civil service statute authorized termination only for cause. Id. at 538-39.
Less formal schemes are equally valid sources of property rights. For example, the United
1992]
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Court has recognized several different types of "property:" "[tiangible
[t]hings" such as a parcel of land; the "bundle" of economically valuable
legal rights incident to ownership of land; and "positive" state law33 that
forms the basis for legally-enforceable expectancies against the state.34 The
Court's preferred phraseology for expectancy-based interests is "legitimate
claim of entitlement.
3 5
Once a court determines that an interest constitutes property, the state
may not deprive a person of the interest without providing constitutionally
adequate procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous deprivations.36 Thus,
the question becomes "what process is due?"'37 The Supreme Court has usu-
ally held that due process requires the state to afford pre-deprivation process
in the form of some notice and opportunity to be heard. 3' The Court, how-
ever, has tempered this requirement by applying a flexible, three factor test
enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.39 Accordingly, in certain situations, pre-
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a school teacher candidate had a pro-
tected property interest in remaining on the school district's hiring-eligibility list. Stana v.
School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1985). The Stana court based this
determination on testimony that the school district had a policy of keeping eligible persons on
the list "for at least two years." Id.
33. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principals Part I-
A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1308-10, 1310 n.41,
1311-16 (1989).
34. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 778 n.21 (1980) (examining a
claim of a property right under Medicare); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (finding a property interest in continued utility service). Mandatory language
in a state statute or rule, or substantive restrictions on the state's use of power respecting an
interest, gives people a right to rely on the continued enjoyment of these interests free from
"unfettered" official discretion. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 10-10, at 698-99 (2d ed. 1987).
35. Craft, 436 U.S. at 9. The Court's guidance on what constitutes a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" is largely in the form of example. One test advocated by the Court defines entitle-
ment-based property interests as those "which cannot be removed except 'for cause.' Once
that characteristic is found, the types of interests protected as 'property' are varied and, as
often as not, intangible, relating to 'the whole domain of social and economic fact.'" Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (citations omitted) (quoting National Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
36. "While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest ... , it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appro-
priate procedural safeguards." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
37. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
38. See supra note 11. The Court has consistently held that pre-deprivation process is the
"root requirement" of the Clause. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
39. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court weighs three factors to determine, under the circum-
stances, the procedural protection that due process requires:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
[Vol. 41:703
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deprivation process is not a constitutional requirement and a post-depriva-
tion remedy at state law can satisfy due process. 4° Governmental exigency4 '
or mere impracticality of providing pre-deprivation process4 2 may mean that
a state judicial remedy provides a plaintiff with all of the process that is
due.
43
One particular species of the impracticality exception is the Parratt rule.'
In Parratt v. Taylor,45 a prisoner brought suit under § 1983 alleging a due
process violation where a prison employee negligently lost the prisoner's
mail-order hobby kit." The Court reasoned that the State could not antici-
pate such a "random and unauthorized act" '4 7 and, under these circum-
stances, the State could not predict when the erroneous deprivation would
occur.4 8 In such cases, the Court held, pre-deprivation process would be
impracticable or even impossible to provide. Thus, a meaningful post-depri-
vation tort remedy at state law can satisfy due process,49 because this type of
remedy is the only process the state can be expected to provide under the
circumstances.5 0
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
40. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990).
41. For example, when a state breaches a dam in order to alleviate the risk of imminent
flooding, the "need to act promptly and decisively" vitiates the pre-deprivation process re-
quirement. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1406 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
42. See infra note 50.
43. "Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry
is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination
of the liability is adequate." Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) (Brandeis,
J.) (citation omitted), quoted in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981).
44. The rule stems from Parratt and its subsequent line of significant limiting and clarify-
ing cases. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 113; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
45. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
46. Id. at 529.
47. Id. at 541.
48. Id.
49. The Court's preference for pre-deprivation process only addresses what is arguably
the first prong of the inquiry, the timing of the process. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 10-14, at 719.
Also relevant are the inquiries into the fundamental fairness of the process, such as the ade-
quacy of notice and formality of procedures. Id. § 10-15, at 732-33. Thus, Parratt apparently
addresses the timeliness aspect of constitutionally adequate process. See Monaghan, supra
note 27, at 984.
50. The unpredictability of "random or unauthorized acts" that render pre-deprivation
process impracticable determines whether Parratt applies to a procedural due process claim; it
is this impracticality that is integrated into the Mathews analysis. Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 129 (1990). The Court's recent opinion in Zinermon revealed that unforeseeable
deprivations are ostensibly impossible to prevent and, thus, "the value of pre-deprivation safe-
1992]
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B. "Substantive" Due Process
The "substantive" component of the Due Process Clause protects
personal interests created not by the state, but by the Constitution itself.5
Substantive due process claims available under § 1983 take two general
forms.52 First, the Clause protects from infringement certain "fundamental
rights," including some important interests based on the Bill of Rights.5 3
Second, the Clause functions independently to proscribe arbitrary govern-
ment action.
54
1. Fundamental Rights: Incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the
Protection of Important Liberties
Some legal scholars describe the Supreme Court's application of the Bill of
Rights to the states as "selective incorporation."55 Selective incorporation
generally refers to the application of the Bill of Rights not in their entirety,56
but selectively through Supreme Court determinations that certain interests
in the Bill of Rights are "fundamental."57 Rights are fundamental, for the
guards ... is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue. Therefore, no matter
how significant the private interest at stake and the risk of its erroneous deprivation, the State
cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing pre-deprivation process."
Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, a post-deprivation remedy alone satisfies due process and
is relevant only when pre-deprivation process is not a constitutional requirement. Failure to
provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy in this instance results in a constitutional viola-
tion. Id. at 126.
51. Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). This statement may be misleading. In many cases the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Constitution to protect "important" interests which, from an "original understanding"
perspective, are extra-constitutional. See supra note 25; see also BERGER, supra note 25, at
269-82 (explaining how the Court's "preferred position" approach diverges from framer
intent).
52. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 414-15 (12th ed. 1991).
TRIBE, supra note 34, § 11-2, at 772-73.
56. Justice Black advocated this "full incorporation" perspective in Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964). The "full incorporation" approach has never been adopted by the Court. TRIBE,
supra note 34, § 11-2, at 772-73.
57. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 n.14 (1968). The Court's incorporation
approach in essence applies to the states those aspects of the Bill of Rights guarantees impor-
tant to the Justices on the Court:
The controversy over the legitimacy of incorporation continues to this day, although
as a matter of judicial practice the issue is settled. Nevertheless, the application of
the states of the Bill of Rights enormously expanded the Court's power. That meant
making its interpretations of the various amendments the uniform law throughout the
nation.
[V/ol. 41:703
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purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, when the right is deter-
mined to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 8 Thus, many of
the rights embodied in the specific guarantees of the First,5 9 Fourth,"o
Fifth,6' Sixth,62 and Eighth6' Amendments apply to the states."M Under an
incorporation perspective, substantive due process violations are analyzed as
a violation of the incorporated right and not as a violation of substantive due
process.6 5
BORK, supra note 25, at 94 (emphasis added); see infra note 64.
58. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Subsequent articulations describe the
incorporation standard as "basic in our system of jurisprudence," In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1948), and "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Duncan, 391
U.S. at 149-50 n.14.
The "privacy cases" bear note here. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Jus-
tice Douglas found justification for the protection of privacy in the "penumbra" of privacy
"emanating" from the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 15.7, at 80 (1986). Critics of the
Douglas approach argue that the Court had merely "Lochnerized" the issue by protecting
privacy as an important "fundamental" interest, placing privacy in a preferred position. See
supra note 25; ROTUNDA ET AL., supra, § 15.7, at 80; Brett J. Williamson, Note, The Consti-
tutional Privacy Doctrine After Bowers v. Hardwick: Rethinking The Second Death of Substan-
tive Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1309-10 (1989). The debate continues in the
abortion cases, beginning with the Court's extension of "fundamental" privacy rights in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Williamson, supra, at 1310.
59. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (applying due process protection
to freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (extending freedom of the
press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (protecting the right to peaceably assem-
ble); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, j7-18 (1939) (protecting the right to petition); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (protecting the free exercise of religion); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (extending the prohibition against government estab-
lishment of religion).
60. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to
state courts).
61. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (extending the freedom against com-
pelled self-incrimination); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (incorporating the
protection against "double jeopardy").
62. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (extending the right to
jury trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (incorporating the right to
counsel in criminal trials).
63. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1962) (applying due process to
"cruel and unusual punishment").
64. For the purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, the Court incorporates
not the amendments per se, but the "fundamental" rights embodied in the amendments. For
example, the Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants a
right to a jury in both state and federal trials, conviction in federal court must be by a unani-
mous jury, while state court convictions need not. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406,U.S. 356, 369-80
(1972). Thus, "the Bill of Rights provisions remain points of reference only." TRIBE, supra
note 34, § 11-2, at 773 n.25.
65. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). In Graham, the Court held that a
§ 1983 suit based on a police brutality claim should have been framed as a Fourth Amendment
19921
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The Court resorts to the "fundamental interests" inquiry utilized in ques-
tions of incorporation66 to afford heightened protection for certain liberties
the Court finds important.67 The Court holds a liberty interest "fundamen-
tal" if it is one "historically and traditionally protected against state interfer-
ence. '"6 For example, the Court has afforded "fundamental" status to
rights of "privacy," 69 interstate travel,"' and the right to vote.71 A state's
attempted abridgement of a "fundamental" right triggers heightened jud-
icial scrutiny72-a less deferential standard than the Court's review for
arbitrariness.73
"seizure" rather than a substantive due process violation based on brutal, malicious conduct.
Id.
66. A plurality Court noted that "[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come
not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history
[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.'" Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 501 (1965)). "A similar restraint marks our approach to questions... whether or to
what extent a guarantee in the Bill of Rights should be 'incorporated' in the Due Process
Clause." Id. at n.10.
67. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (applying the liberty interest in choices concerning
family living arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a liberty interest in a
woman's choice to obtain an abortion); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (holding the "right to pri-
vacy" a fundamental liberty). These cases considered whether the interests involved were fun-
damental and thus qualified for increased protection under the Due Process Clause. See supra
notes 25, 58.
68. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859-60 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Different articulations run throughout the Court's opinions.
See id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting that "our notions of liberty are inex-
tricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination"); see also Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (describing fundamental liberties as those "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition") (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 502-03).
69. See supra note 58. The privacy right itself is expansive, and encompasses a range of
personal and family decisions. See ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 58, § 15.7, at 85.
70. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (holding the right to
interstate travel fundamental), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (overrul-
ing Shapiro's implication that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar certain retroactive
relief).
71. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (applying the
equal protection clause to a state infringement on the right to vote).
72. For example, the Roe Court held that state abortion laws are subject to "strict scru-
tiny," a standard that requires the state to demonstrate that its law is "necessary" to promote a
"compelling" governmental interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); ROTUNDA ET
AL., supra note 58, § 18.29, at 190 (Supp. 1991). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992), the Court redefined the right it announced in Roe and adopted an "undue bur-
den" analysis for determining the infringement of that right. Id. at 2816-22.
73. Under a review for arbitrariness, the government act need only be "rational;" the
government interest, only "legitimate." Id. § 18.1, at 316 (discussing the difference among
levels of deference under equal protection analysis which, with respect to "fundamental"
rights, differs from due process only in that equal protection analysis involves a class
distinction).
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2. Protection From the Arbitrary Imposition of Government Power
Protection from arbitrary, unjust government is fundamentally and histor-
ically rooted in the concept of "due process."7 4 However, the government
may deprive persons of life, liberty, and property so long as the deprivation
is accompanied by due process. 7" Due process is valued for three reasons: it
requires the implementation of some procedure that slows government
down; it allows individuals to participate in the deprivation process; and it
requires government to justify its actions.76
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pre-
serve this understanding of due process by barring "certain arbitrary, wrong-
ful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.' "77 Procedural due process, as the Supreme Court uses
the term, refers to the requirement that government establish procedures
74. See Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process Law: The American Constitutional
Tradition, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PRocESS 3, 4-5 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1977). Professor Miller traces the concept of due process from its conception in the
Magna Carta.
75. Hence the guarantee that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
76. See Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
NOMOS XVIII: DUE PRocESS, supra note 74, at 126, 127. Professor Michelman wrote:
Due process ights... depend on preexisting legal entitlements. These entitlements
are not absolute claims which override all possible counterarguments, but rather are
claims triggering requirements for some sort of justification-where justification
means an objectively verifiable account of a person's conduct or the circumstances
attending it, the truth of which will absolve conduct of legally wrongful quality de-
spite its harmfulness to another.
Id. at 132.
77. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)). In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Justice Harlan advocated an expan-
sive view of the Clause that recognizes the due process protection of less-than-fundamental
interests:
[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found
in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is
a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substan-
tial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes, what
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). A plurality Court quoted Justice Harlan's view with ap-
proval in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). Graham v. O'Connor, therefore,
when read in conjunction with the above cited quotes from Zinermon and Poe, offers contem-
porary support for Justice Harlan's view that due process independently affords a substantive
freedom from an "arbitrary imposition" of government power. See supra note 65 and accom-
panying text.
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giving persons notice and an opportunity to be heard upon being deprived of
a protected interest.7" Substantive due process, as the Court has sometimes
used the term, refers to the requirement that government must have a good
reason-a rational basis-for the deprivations it effects. 9
In cases involving deprivations of property rights, substantive due process
claims are usually leveled at statutory or regulatory schemes enacted pursu-
ant to the state's "police power."' It is well settled, for example, that a
state may constitutionally implement land use regulations that are not
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'" However, in cases where
the plaintiff does not challenge the statutory scheme affecting a property
78. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (reflecting the Court's preference for "notice"
and "an opportunity to be heard"). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
79. Professor Scanlon notes that "[d]ue process is... one of the strategies through which
one may seek to avoid arbitrary power by altering the conditions under which decisions are
made." T.M. Scanlon, Due Process, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PRocEss, supra note 74, at 93, 97.
However, Professor Scanlon categorizes the protection against arbitrary government as a type
of procedural due process, and characterizes a reviewing court as "one of the appeals stages in
an established system of due process." Id. at 101.
80. Most familiar are those schemes that restrict land use. The Court has applied a "ra-
tional basis" test to determine whether the statute is arbitrary, or whether it is rationally re-
lated to a valid state interest. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373
(1926). But see infra note 81.
81. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. A landowner who wishes to challenge a land-use regulation
can do so on two grounds. First, the landowner can attack the regulation as a deprivation of
property without due process. Id. Second, the landowner can allege that the regulation consti-
tutes a "taking" for which compensation is required under the Fifth Amendment. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978). The Court's "regulatory
takings" analysis is not settled. In Penn Central, the Court confused due process analysis with
takings analysis. Margaret Lang, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: Fair-
ness and Accommodation Show the Way Out of the Takings Corner, 13 URB. LAW. 89, 92-93
(1981).
In Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), the Court posited a two-prong test, holding
that a "taking" occurs when a valid regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land," or where the regulation fails to "substantially advance legitimate state interests." Id. at
260. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 231 (1988). In a series of cases
decided during the 1986-1987 term, the Court intimated that it was subjecting regulations to a
heightened level of scrutiny under the second prong. Id. at 238-39; see also Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See generally, Seth E. Zucker-
man, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States" The Claims Court Takes a Wrong Turn-
Toward a Higher Standard of Review, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 753, 771-77 (1991) (comparing the
different formulations of the Supreme Court's takings analysis).
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right, the Supreme Court's precedent provides little direct guidance for ex-
amining an "arbitrary and capricious" claim.
8 2
II. IMPLYING THE PROTECTION FOR PROPERTY INTERESTS
The Supreme Court has considered substantive due process claims for
property deprivations outside the context of a challenge to a statute or regu-
lation. In a somewhat false start, the Supreme Court glossed over the issue
in Harrah Independent School District v. Martin. 3 In Harrah, the school
board declined to renew a tenured instructor's employment contract after
she repeatedly refused to comply with a continuing education requirement in
the contract.84 Originally, the school district withheld pay as a sanction for
nonperformance of the continuing education clause.8" Contract non-re-
newal was implemented prospectively after Martin received tenure.8 6 The
board informed Martin that it would not renew her contract and afforded a
hearing with her attorney present.8 7 At the hearing, Martin argued that the
board could not refuse to renew her contract because contract non-renewal
was implemented subsequent to her tenure and operated only prospec-
tively.88 The district court dismissed Martin's claim that the board's appli-
cation of the sanction violated due process.89 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that although Martin had
no protected liberty interest, the school board's arbitrary and capricious re-
fusal to renew her contract violated due process. 90
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Tenth Circuit, noted that the interest
asserted was unlike the fundamental interests asserted in other substantive
due process claims it had previously considered.91 The Court emphasized
that the claim was only that the school board could not, consistent with due
82. Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 1988). In such cases,
the property interests in question are entitlement-based interests, interests which normally trig-
ger procedural due process analysis. Id.
83. 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 196.
85. Id. at 197.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 198.
89. The district court ruled, on the basis of the stipulated evidence, that Harrah failed to
state a due process claim. Id. at 196.
90. Id. at 196-97. Martin v. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.2d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per curiam). The circuit court reasoned that the school
board's "arbitrary and capricious" dismissal "violated... notions of fairness embodied in the
Due Process Clause generally." Id.
91. Harrah, 440 U.S. at 198. The Court found no resemblance between the asserted claim
and "the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation,
marriage, and family life." Id. (quoting Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976)).
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process, arbitrarily apply the purely prospective sanction to Martin.92
Rather than discussing the circumstances under which such a claim was
cognizable, the Court held that Martin bore the burden of showing that the
school board's action was not rationally related to its interest in maintaining
the quality of its faculty.93 In finding that Martin failed to meet that burden,
the Court held that a rational relationship existed, and that consequently
Martin could not claim a denial of substantive due process.94
In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,95 the Court considered a
similar due process claim, but again failed to provide any guidelines for de-
termining the existence of the due process right it applied. In Ewing, a stu-
dent brought a § 1983 action against a state university, challenging his
dismissal from an academic program.96 The university's academic board re-
viewed Ewing's testing and research performance and voted to remove Ew-
ing from the program.97 Ewing appealed this decision to the university on
several occasions, but the dismissal was upheld. 98
Ewing then brought suit in district court, alleging as his only federal claim
that the faculty arbitrarily dismissed him from the program in violation of
due process. 99 The district court recognized the existence of such substan-
tive claims,"°° but dismissed Ewing's claim on the merits, finding that the
university had "good cause" to dismiss him. 0 ' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the dismissal was arbi-
trary in light of the university's stated qualification standards.102 The
92. Id. The school district conceded the existence of a protected property interest. Id at
197.
93. Id. at 198.
94. Id. at 199. The Court held that the application of the sanction by "a school board
responsible for the public education of students within its jurisdiction, and employing teachers
to perform the principal portion of that task, can scarcely be described as arbitrary." Id.
95. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
96. Id. at 217.
97. Id. at 216. The six-year medical training program required the student to complete
four years of undergraduate study and pass a comprehensive examination before advancing to
the clinical training that comprised the final two years. Id. at 215. Ewing failed the compre-
hensive exam, receiving the lowest score in the history of the program. Id. at 216.
98. Id. at 216-17.
99. Ewing v. Board of Regents, 559 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 913
(6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
100. The district court ruled that Ewing had a property right in continued enrollment, and
that therefore Ewing's dismissal was reviewable under a substantive due process standard. Id.
at 799.
101. Id. at 800.
102. Ewing, 742 F.2d at 916. The university's program brochure stated that students
would be permitted to retake the board examination that Ewing failed. Ewing, 474 U.S. at
219. The circuit court held that Ewing had a "contract right to continued enrollment free
from arbitrary interference," and that this right constituted "property" for the purposes of the
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the circuit court
misapplied substantive due process, and reversed.
0 3
The Supreme Court did not consider whether Ewing had a protectable
property interest in continued enrollment. Rather, the Court assumed the
existence of a property right and that an arbitrary and capricious dismissal
could constitute a due process violation."°4 The Court, however, reversed on
the merits, holding that the record reflected no arbitrary university action. 05
Thus, the Court suggested that deprivations of property interests were re-
viewable under an "arbitrary and capricious" due process standard."
However, the Court failed to articulate a clear test for determining the cir-
cumstances that will trigger this "substantive" component of the Clause.
Justice Powell, in concurrence, sought to temper the unanimous Court's
open-ended opinion.'0° He cautioned that not all state-created entitlements
can support a substantive due process claim.°10 According to Justice Pow-
ell, the application of substantive due process should be governed by "cau-
tion and restraint."'" He would limit the application to those "fundamental
interests" that receive implied protection from the Court. 1 This caveat
would prove very influential among some circuit courts.1 '
Due Process Clause. Id. at 221. The university did not permit Ewing to retest, but allowed
seven other students to retake the examination. Id.
103. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 221.
104. Id. at 223.
105. Id. The Court found that the faculty's decision "was made conscientiously and with
careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of Ewing's academic career." Id. at
225.
106. Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, The Seventh Circuit Review--Develop-
ments in Civil Liberties: 1984-85 Term, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 437 (1986).
107. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228-30 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell opined that aca-
demic decisions made by appropriate authorities should be subject to judicial review only in
rare circumstances. Id at 230.
108. Id. at 229.
109. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
110. Id. at 229-30. Justice Powell commented that Ewing's interest was "not closely tied to
'respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation
of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.'" Id. at 230 (quot-
ing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)).
111. See Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989), discussed infra at notes 142-55 and
accompanying text; see also Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1990), discussed infra
at notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
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III. CIRCUIT COURT DEVELOPMENT: FORUM OVER FORM
The very language of the Due Process Clause protects property coexten-
sively with life and liberty.112 But to assert, as a tautology, that an interest is
"property" and is thus explicitly protected by substantive due process begs
the question.' 13 Although the Supreme Court does not foreclose the appli-
cation of substantive due process to all property interests, Justice Powell's
refusal to extend protection to less-than-fundamental interests has been ex-
plicitly adopted by some circuit courts. 114 The lack of guidance provided by
the Court has resulted in differing circuit court analyses that have added to
the confusion.' However, these analyses have provided some insight into
both the sources and the limits of the application of substantive due process
to property rights.
A. Acceptance and Application: Substantive Protection
for Property Interests
Some circuit courts, particularly the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, will per-
mit substantive due process claims for arbitrary and capricious deprivations
of property rights.116 Nonetheless, the decisions of these two circuits are
characterized by intra-circuit inconsistency.117 Therefore, the decisions fail
to provide a definitive resolution of whether and when arbitrary deprivations
of property rights trigger substantive due process protection.
In Moore v. Warwick Public School District No. 29,118 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined a claim by a dismissed
public school superintendent who alleged that the school district illegally
terminated him because of his glaucoma-related blindness.1 9 After Moore
refused the school's request that he resign, the school board discharged him
112. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
113. Justice Powell's refusal to extend substantive due process to less-than-fundamental
property interests suggests a bifurcated approach to due process protection for property that
fails to find support from the language or the history of the Clause. See infra notes 204-06 and
accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 152-53, 163-66 and accompanying text.
115. See Charles, 910 F.2d at 1354 (collecting cases); see also Reich, 883 F.2d at 243-44
(surveying the differing analyses of the several circuit courts that have considered the
question).
116. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Moore v. Warwick Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322 (8th
Cir. 1986).
117. See infra notes 128, 141.
118. 794 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1986).
119. Id. at 323.
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upon a unanimous vote.' 2° Moore brought suit under § 1983, alleging both
procedural and substantive due process violations. 2 ' The district court
granted summary judgment for the school district, holding that the Parratt
rule barred Moore's procedural claim.122 The district court further found
that Moore failed to meet his burden of establishing that his dismissal was
arbitrary. 1
23
The Eighth Circuit reversed on both claims.' 24 After finding that Moore's
procedural claim was not barred by the Parratt rule,' 25 the court considered
the substantive due process claim. The court found that Harrah Independ-
ent School District v. Martin 126 controlled Moore's case, based on the simi-
larity between the facts of Harrah and the allegations in Moore's
complaint.' 2 7 Without reaching the merits, the court held that under Har-
rah, Moore alleged a "cognizable substantive due process claim" and re-
manded the case to the district court for consideration consistent with
Harrah. 128
In Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley,129 the Owners Asso-
ciation brought a suit for damages under § 1983. The complaint alleged, in
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The district court reasoned that because Moore had an adequate post-deprivation
remedy in a state court breach of contract claim, the procedural requirements of due process
had been satisfied. Id. at 326.
123. Id. at 328.
124. Id. at 330. The panel ruled that the district court's sua sponte grant of summary
judgment was improper. Id at 325.
125. The circuit court held that Parratt did not apply unless the district court first deter-
mined whether Moore was entitled to a pre-termination hearing. Id. at 326. See supra note 50
(discussing why a post-deprivation remedy is relevant only where pre-deprivation process is
not a constitutional requirement). The court held that pre-deprivation process was not "im-
possible," and remanded the claim to the district court for consideration under the test enunci-
ated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra note 39.
126. 440 U.S. 194 (1979). The Moore court did not mention Ewing, which was released
two months prior to the circuit court's consideration.
127. Moore, 794 F.2d at 329. The Moore holding is admittedly a narrow one. The court
prefaced its holding by conceding that the Eighth Circuit had not definitively recognized the
existence of such substantive due process rights. The holding was then specifically premised
on the facts of Harrah. Id. The court was interested only in determining whether Moore had
an "actionable substantive due process claim." Id.
128. Substantive due process claims, however, are still viewed with skepticism in the
Eighth Circuit:
This court ... has placed a heavy burden on one wishing to extend the substantive
due process doctrine into new arenas. The conduct involved must "shock [the] con-
science or otherwise offend our judicial notions of fairness." It must be conduct
"offensive to human dignity." We have yet to decide whether substantive due pro-
cess provides a right to be free from arbitrary and capricious state action.
Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
129. 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
part, that the defendants violated the Owners Association's due process
rights when they evacuated the residents of the lake and breached the Asso-
ciation-owned dam after determining that the water level was dangerously
high. 130 The dam breach occurred without notice to the residents, and after
the City gave assurance that it would not be breached. 13' The district court
granted the defendants a judgment on the pleadings on ripeness grounds.
32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined the
claims de novo and reversed.
133
The circuit court first disposed of the procedural due process claim, hold-
ing that the breach was an "emergency procedure" and that pre-deprivation
process was therefore not a constitutional requirement. 134 The court then
embarked on a lengthy analysis of the plaintiffs' substantive due process
claim, and held that the plaintiffs, by alleging that officials "destroy[ed] the
dam for no legitimate reason," had stated a colorable claim.' 31 In reaching
this result, the court began with an expansive view of due process jurispru-
dence based on "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause ... which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... "1 3 6 The court then set
out its preliminary standard for the substantive due process claim-whether
"the government's action was 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.' ,137
130. Id. at 1401. The Owners Association owned both the dam in question and the lake
behind it. The City evacuated the residents after heavy rains led to an accumulation of water
that caused two slides on the face of the dam. Id.
131. Id. at 1408.
132. Id. at 1401. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged both an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment and a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 1404. The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies
and, thus, the claims were not ripe. Id. at 1402. The circuit court upheld the district court's
ruling with respect to the takings claim, but reversed on the due process claim, holding that
the exhaustion requirement did not apply to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims. Id.
at 1403-04.
133. Id. at 1401-02, 1411.
134. Id. at 1406; see supra note 41 and accompanying text. The panel also considered
whether the Parratt rule barred the claim. Id. at 1405. The court held that Parratt did not bar
the claim because the defendants could not allege random, unauthorized action where the
decision to breach the dam was made by senior officials pursuant to a state statute. Id.
135. Id. at 1410.
136. Id. at 1409 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
quoted with approval in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality
opinion)).
137. Id. at 1407 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926)). Thus, the court directly applied the Supreme Court's test for the validity of land-use
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Mindful of the countervailing government interests at stake, the court pos-
ited a balancing test to determine, based on the circumstances, whether the
state violated the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The test balanced
"the need for the governmental action in question, the relationship between
the need and the action, the extent of harm inflicted, and whether the action
was taken in good faith or for the purpose of causing harm."13 The court
then remanded the case for trial.
B. Reluctance and Rejection
In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,139 Justice Powell, in con-
currence, admonished, "[t]he history of substantive due process 'counsels
caution and restraint.' "" The lack of direct guidance from the Court in
the Harrah and Ewing decisions has resulted in circuit court holdings
marked by hesitancy and doubt. 141
In Reich v. Beharry,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered a deprivation of a property right, and declined to recog-
nize a seemingly compelling claim of malicious abuse of governmental
regulations to an official's act under the state's code. The plaintiffs challenged not the code
provision, but the reasonableness of the official action.
138. Id. at 1409. These factors are an adaptation of a test posited in Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973), quoted infra at note 229.
Although the circuit court on remand did not offer the district court any guidance on the use
of the test, the court elaborated on the competing interests at stake, and conceded that "gov-
ernmental entities must have much latitude in carrying out their police power responsibilities;
mere errors of judgment, or actions that are mistaken or misguided, do not violate due process.
But malicious, irrational and plainly arbitrary actions are not within the legitimate purview of
the state's power." Sinaloa, 882 F.2d at 1409.
139. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
140. Id. at 229 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 502). This caution is
manifest in the Court's repeated warning that federal courts should not "make of the Four-
teenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already
be administered by the States." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); accord Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
141. In Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1057 (1990),
the court examined whether substantive due process protection for property interests in public
employment was "clearly established" for the purposes of a qualified immunity claim. Id. at
1386-87. The court, in considering the status of the case law at that time, noted that some of
the circuits
either left the issue open, summarily addressed the issue and found no violation, or
held explicitly that there was no substantive due process right. The First and Third
Circuits refused to address whether such a right existed, expressly leaving the ques-
tion open because the cases presenting the question did not involve a property inter-
est sufficient to trigger any due process protection.
Id. at 1387.
142. 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989).
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power. 143 Reich was an attorney appointed by the county as a special prose-
cutor to investigate and prosecute alleged wrongdoing by Beharry, the
County Controller.'" The County Controller was authorized, in her discre-
tion, to approve payment on county contracts.'4 5 When Reich billed the
county for services rendered, Beharry twice refused to authorize Reich's
compensation.'" At a County Salary Board meeting, Beharry alone voted
against confirming Reich's appointment and salary, calling Reich a "hired
gun."' 4  Reich then filed a § 1983 action alleging violations of procedural
and substantive due process. The district court subsequently granted
Beharry's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.' 48 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit assumed, without de-
ciding, that Reich had a protected property interest, 14 9 and affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of Reich's procedural due process claim.'° The court
then considered Reich's substantive due process claim that Beharry's "per-
sonal animosity" motivated her refusal to pay.'
5'
The court began by considering the nature and importance of Reich's as-
serted property interest, and accorded it substantially less significance than
other interests that had been refused substantive due process protection by
143. Id. at 245.
144. Id. at 239.
145. Id. at 240.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 241.
148. Id. The district court, without determining "whether Beharry's act was 'random and
unauthorized,' " held that Reich's claim was barred by Parrat. Id. The Third Circuit upheld
the district court's dismissal of the procedural due process claim on other grounds. See infra
note 150.
149. Id. at 242. The court, however, was skeptical at the existence of a property right
where Reich's interest, at most, was in the receipt of prompt payment without having to liti-
gate a breach of contract claim in state court. Id. at 243. For further discussion on the propri-
ety of recognizing property rights based on government contract expectancies, see S & D
Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1988).
150. Reich, 883 F.2d at 243. The court applied the Mathews test and found that, given the
large number of invoices processed by the county, the costs of providing notice and a hearing
prior to a refusal to pay outweighed the usefulness of any such process in preventing an errone-
ous refusal. Id. The court held that pre-deprivation process was not required under the cir-
cumstances, and that Reich's state law remedy for breach of contract provided him with
constitutionally adequate process. Id. at 242-43.
151. Id. at 243.
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the court. 5 2 Sharing Justice Powell's doubt 15 3 about the protection of a
less-than-fundamental interest,1 54 the panel then held that there was no in-
dependent basis for recognizing a substantive due process claim for the
deprivaton of Reich's property interest.
1 55
Similarly, in Charles v. Baesler,156 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit considered a contract-based property interest and found
that it was not entitled to substantive due process protection. 57 The plain-
tiff-appellant Charles brought suit under § 1983, alleging that the City's re-
fusal to promote him within the fire department violated due process where
Charles' name appeared at the top of an eligibility list for promotion. 5 '
Charles based his property right on the relevant statutes and ordinances that
governed such promotions.' 5 9 The district court held that the statute con-
ferred upon Charles a legitimate claim of entitlement to the promotion, and
thus a contractually-based property right protected by procedural due pro-
cess." 6 The circuit court left this finding undisturbed.
1 61
152. In Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1988), the same circuit held that a
legitimate claim of entitlement to continued utility service-a property right previously recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1
(1978)-would not support a substantive due process claim. In Ransom, the issue was whether
city policy violated substantive due process where the city conditioned the receipt of utility
service on payment of overdue charges incurred by the prior occupant of the premises. Ran-
som, 848 F.2d at 411-12. However, in Ransom, there was no arbitrary or wrongful act by a
government official. The court also cited Mauriello v. University of Medicine & Dentistry, 781
F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986), a case involving an academic dismissal similar to the facts in Ewing.
The panel in Mauriello gave particular weight to the concurrence in Ewing, "shar(ing] Justice
Powell's doubt about the existence of such a substantive due process right" under the circum-
stances. Id. at 52. The Mauriello court, however, like the Court in Ewing, assumed the exist-
ence of the right, reached the merits of the claim, and found no arbitrary or capricious action.
Id.
153. The Reich panel echoed the doubt of the circuit's opinion in Mauriello. See supra note
152.
154. Reich, 883 F.2d at 244.
155. Id. at 245.
156. 910 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1990).
157. Id. at 1353.
158. Id at 1350-52. The government's personnel director failed to replace an expired eligi-
bility list with a new eligibility list. Had the personnel director done so, Charles would have
been absolutely entitled to the promotion. Id
159. Ordinances in effect guaranteed that if a vacancy was announced for promotion, and
the mayor did not abolish the vacancy within ninety days, the person to appear first on the
promotion list would be promoted. Id. at 1350. The mayor failed to abolish the vacancy
within ninety days, and Charles, who appeared first on the list, would have been promoted.
Instead, the government failed to appoint anyone, and eventually abolished the vacancy. Id. at
1351.
160. Id. at 1352.
161. Id.
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The panel then addressed the district court's finding that Charles' right to
promotion implicated the protection of substantive due process. 162 The
court acknowledged the Supreme Court's decision in Ewing, which implied
that arbitrary deprivations of property might violate due process, but explic-
itly adopted Justice Powell's position and refused to recognize substantive
due process protection for interests of less-than-fundamental significance.
163
Operating under the premise that only "fundamental" interests receive sub-
stantive due process protection, the court broadly held that "run-of-the-
mill" contract-based property rights fail to qualify as fundamental,' 6 rea-
soning that "neither liberty nor justice would [cease to] exist if [they] were
sacrificed."' 65 The court then rejected Charles' claim, holding that Charles'
interest failed to qualify as "fundamental."'
166
C. Application to Parratt-barred Claims
Academics disagree over the fundamental import of Parratt and whether
application of the Parratt rule to a procedural due process claim should also
control substantive due process claims.' 67 The most compelling of these per-
162. The circuit court did not characterize Charles' claim as one of "arbitrary and capri-
cious" conduct. Charles had an absolute right to the promotion itself that was not subject to
official discretion. Thus, the court phrased the issue as whether Charles could constitutionally
be denied promotion at all. Id. at 1352-53. Assumedly, however, the City's refusal to promote
Charles without legitimate reason, despite his continued eligibility and absolute right, would
constitute arbitrary action. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
163. Id. at 1354; see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
164. The court sought to distinguish Charles' claim that he was arbitrarily denied promo-
tion from claims arising in the context of a tenured employee's termination. Id. at 1355. Rely-
ing on circuit precedent, the court urged that the "ready availability of routine state-law
remedies [is] one useful factor in determining whether a given interest should be recognized as
constitutionally fundamental." Id. (citing Ramsey v. Board of Educ. of Whitley County, 844
F.2d 1268, 1274-75 (6th Cir. 1988)). However, Supreme Court precedent teaches otherwise:
"'[plroperty' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than
can life or liberty." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1986) (discuss-
ing procedural due process); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (reiterating
that substantive due process claims are complete when the arbitrary action occurs, without
regard to the adequacy of state-provided procedures).
165. Charles, 910 F.2d at 1353 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)).
The court elaborated that "any claim that Charles' right to promotion.., is deeply rooted in
our national history and tradition is both legally and historically indefensible." Id.
166. In dicta, the court noted:
[W]e do not conclude that all state-created contract rights lack substantive due pro-
cess protection. For example, substantive due process may well protect a contract
right to keep a tenured job, although it may also be, in light of the fact that "substan-
tive due process rights are created only by the Constitution," that tenure is in fact a
protected fundamental liberty interest once it is conferred by contract.
Id. at 1355 (citations omitted).
167. Professor Nahmod concludes that Parratt is limited to and justifiable only within pro-
cedural due process, because "substantive due process challenges are challenges to governmen-
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spectives suggests that in cases where Parratt bars the procedural due pro-
cess claim, permitting a substantive due process claim for arbitrary
government action would effectively overrule Parratt.'68 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 69
held precisely that.
In Schaper, a former police captain brought suit under § 1983 alleging
that he was unconstitutionally terminated from his public employment.'
70
Schaper claimed that a politically-motivated city manager conspired with
the police chief to remove Schaper, and that the city manager, in reviewing
the termination decision, was biased.'
7'
The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing the district court's denial of summary
judgment, first considered Schaper's procedural due process claim.' 72 After
finding that Schaper had a constitutionally protected property interest in
employment,' 73 the panel held that the Parratt rule barred Schaper's claim
that the bias in his pre-deprivation hearing denied him constitutionally ade-
quate process.' 74 The alleged conspiracy and bias, the court reasoned, con-
stituted "random and unauthorized conduct" and, thus, the state was not in
a position to prevent the wrongful deprivation. 175 Because the City provided
tal conduct itself, irrespective of the absence of hearings." Nahmod, supra note 27, at 252-53.
Other scholars argue that Parratt should be overruled or redefined because the theory of Par-
ratt-that some instances of official misconduct do not violate due process-cannot be recon-
ciled with the other "components" of due process. Monaghan, supra note 27, at 994.
168. See Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987), discussed infra at
notes 169-84 and accompanying text. See also Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951
(7th Cir. 1988), discussed infra at notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
169. 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987).
170. Id. at 712.
171. Schaper was suspended without pay after an indictment for falsifying automobile title
documents. Id. at 711-12. Schaper claimed that he entered a plea of nolo contendere based on
the city manager's alleged assurance that Schaper would avoid termination. Id. at 712. The
chief of police subsequently resigned after being indicted for the same fraud. Id. The replace-
ment chief was allegedly involved in the conspiracy. Id.
172. Id. at 713-16.
173. Id at 713-14.
174. Id. at 716.
175. Id. at 715. The court's holding-that Parratt bars claims based on inadequate proce-
dures resulting from a biased decision-maker-represents a truly remarkable result. Where
the state explicitly vests the decision-maker with authority to effect the deprivation, the char-
acterization of the deprivation as "unauthorized" seems anomalous when compared with the
facts of Parratt, see supra notes 45- 48 and accompanying text, and the Court's recent holding
that Parratt does not apply to deprivations arising from an "established state procedure" or
"by an official's abuse of his position." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 130-31 (1990).
Although the court's reliance on Parratt may be misplaced, the same result-that a post-depri-
vation remedy can satisfy due process-can be reached if the facts of Schaper are analyzed
under the Mathews factors. See supra note 39. Such an analysis suggests that biased decision-
making, much like a random and unauthorized act, is virtually impossible for the state to
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an "appeal as of right," the court concluded, Schaper received all of the
process that was due, and thus no procedural due process violation
occurred. 1
76
The court then turned to Schaper's substantive due process claim and held
that any such claim, if it existed, was implicitly barred by Parratt.177 The
court noted that Parratt does not bar "substantive due process" claims based
on an incorporated right,17 8 but that "random and unauthorized conduct"
might vitiate a substantive due process claim where the plaintiff alleges arbi-
trary and capricious action.' 79 The panel then compared the substantive
interests protected by the Bill of Rights with the interest that Schaper as-
serted and found that, while the incorporated rights enjoy protected status
independent of the Due Process Clause, Schaper's asserted interest derived
from state law, and not the Constitution. 8° Thus, the court held, Schaper
merely advanced his Parratt-barred procedural claim under the substantive
due process name.' The court then refused to allow Schaper's claim, be-
cause to recognize it would permit plaintiffs to allege arbitrary and capri-
cious state action in cases where the Parratt rule barred actions based on a
"random and unauthorized" act.'8 2 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned,
predict or prevent. Thus, "the value of predeprivation safeguards... is negligible in prevent-
ing the kind of deprivation at issue." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129.
176. Schaper, 813 F.2d at 716.
177. Id. at 718. The court cited Ewing and Harrah, as well as precedent from within the
Fifth Circuit, but did not conclude whether an arbitrary and capricious deprivation of
Schaper's right to continued employment would constitute a substantive due process claim.
Id. at 716-17. Rather, the court advanced to the question whether Parratt barred the substan-
tive claim. Id. The Fifth Circuit does, however, recognize such claims. In Honore v.
Douglass, 833 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1987), a university professor was refused tenure and subse-
quently terminated with constitutionally adequate procedure. "[D]espite this finding of proce-
dural adequacy," the court held,
we do not agree with the trial court's rejection of the substantive due process claim.
To reach the jury with his substantive due process claim, Honore must demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact about his protected property interest (entitlement to
vested tenure) and the university's arbitrary or capricious deprivation of that interest.
Id. at 568.
178. Schaper, 813 F.2d at 717. For a convincing argument that the Parratt Court implic-
itly excluded the incorporated rights from its holding, see Nahmod, supra note 27, at 233-34.
179. Schaper, 813 F.2d at 718.
180. Id.
181. Id. The court held that "Schaper's substantive rights mirror his procedural rights,
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would effectively overrule Parratt.1s 3 The court then ruled that the availa-
bility of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy again satisfied due process.'8 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on
Schaper to reach the same holding in Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Co. of
Illinois.' In Kauth, the plaintiff brought suit under § 1983 after the state
seized Kauth's property pursuant to a court-ordered writ of attachment.
18 6
After the sheriff executed the facially valid writ of attachment, the state's
intermediate court of appeals vacated the writ upon discovering that the writ
was issued on the basis of a defective affidavit.'8 7 The court, however, failed
to order the return of Kauth's property, which was subsequently sold at an
auction. 
88
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, citing
Kauth's failure to state a constitutional claim. 189 The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, holding that Kauth's procedural due process claim was barred by
Parratt's post-deprivation remedy rationale, and therefore Kauth's substan-
tive due process claim must fail as well."9
In denying Kauth's procedural claim, the Seventh Circuit first noted that
the state attachment statute mandated a prompt post-attachment hearing for
183. Id.
184. Id. at 718. The court's prior holding in Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.
1986) expands upon this line of reasoning. In Holloway, the plaintiff alleged a deprivation of
property by a biased state court judge. Id at 1288. Although the facts of Holloway implicated
the fundamental and independent "right to a fair trial," the underlying rationale of Holloway
and Schaper is identical. The Holloway court reasoned at length that:
[The plaintiffs] argue that a fair trial is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
and that a judicial conspiracy to deprive litigants of their property "shocks the
conscience."
Assuming for the sake of this analysis that plaintiffs established a judicial conspir-
acy, the resultant shocked conscience cannot displace common sense. That sense dic-
tates that the right to an impartial judge is a matter of procedural, not substantive,
due process. To hold otherwise would be to fictionalize solely for the purpose of
avoiding application of Parratt/Hudson a situation to which Parratt/Hudson was
clearly meant to apply, i.e., where a plaintiff is deprived of his property by the unex-
pected, unauthorized act of a state employee. As the district court noted, the effect
of accepting plaintiffs' argument would be to hold that although a person fails to
state a due process claim by complaining that he was deprived of property without
due process (under Parratt/Hudson), he nonetheless states a due process claim by
complaining he was not provided due process while being deprived of his property.
We cannot undermine Parratt/Hudson in this way.
Id. at 1293-94 (citations omitted).
185. 852 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1988).
186. Id. at 952-53.
187. Id. at 953.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 954.
190. Id. at 958.
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aggrieved parties. 191 Kauth had received several such hearings. 192 Holding
that these post-deprivation hearings satisfied due process, the court cited
Parratt to hold that Kauth received constitutionally adequate procedure. 193
The court then proceeded to analyze Kauth's claim from a substantive
due process perspective. After noting the Supreme Court's open-ended deci-
sion in Ewing, the Kauth court expressed reluctance to recognize such claims
without further Supreme Court guidance.194 Further, the court found that
allowing such claims would encourage plaintiffs to avoid Parratt by framing
their claims in substantive due process terms1 9 5 The panel then cited Par-
ratt and Schaper to hold that Kauth could not state a due process claim for
an arbitrary deprivation of property.196 However, the Kauth court barred
the claim not because the deprivation was random or unauthorized, but
solely because the state provided a post-deprivation remedy for make-whole
relief. 197
The Kauth court went further, however, and developed a rule. A plaintiff
cannot state a due process violation for arbitrary or capricious deprivations
unless the plaintiff also alleges either a violation of a separate constitutional
right or that the state law remedies are constitutionally inadequate.1 98 Thus,
because Kauth did not attack the adequacy of the available post-deprivation
remedies, and because no other constitutional interest was implicated, the
court held that Kauth could not state a due process claim.' 9 9
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE MIRE
The foregoing cases raise several salient questions. What is the source of
this substantive due process protection for property? Is it based on the sig-
nificance of the interest, as Justice Powell counsels? If so, does the protec-
tion cover only those interests the Court deems "fundamental?" Or, is the
freedom from arbitrary and capricious deprivations of property absolute, as
posited by the Ninth Circuit in Sinaloa? Further, are substantive due pro-
191. Id. at 955.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 955-56. Although the circuit court cites Parratt's adequate post-deprivation
remedy exception as dispositive, the court did not inquire whether pre-deprivation process was
possible or practical under the circumstances. Id. at 955. See supra note 50. The court's dis-
missal is perhaps better explained by its finding that Kauth failed to attack the constitutional
adequacy of the process the state afforded. Id. at 955-56.
194. Id. at 956.
195. Id. at 957.
196. Id. at 957-58.
197. Id. at 958. The panel cited Kauth's failure to argue that the state tort remedies were
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cess claims for arbitrary and capricious deprivations of property vitiated
where the Parratt rule bars the procedural due process claim based on the
same property right? If so, why?
A. An Unconditional Freedom From Arbitrary Action?
The Supreme Court has discussed the general purpose of the Due Process
Clause in language confirming that the Fourteenth Amendment creates a
right to be free from "certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions. ' '2°°
Indeed, this substantive right is the "touchstone of due process."2 ' In Dan-
iels v. Williams,2" 2 the Court gave a brief historical overview of the Due
Process Clause. Comparing the Clause to the Magna Carta, then-Justice
Rehnquist remarked that both were "intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.
20 3
Further, the Court has not suggested a basis or justification for discrimi-
nating among property interests, but has nonetheless implied that non-fun-
damental property interests do trigger substantive due process protection.2° 4
Thus, the proposition that only some property interests are entitled to sub-
stantive due process protection suggests a dichotomy that has no basis in
either precedent or the history of the Clause.2 °5 Nevertheless, certain appel-
200. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted supra note 77.
201. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); see Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123-24 (1889) (noting that the purpose of due process is to "secure the citizen against any
arbitrary deprivation of... rights").
202. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
203. Id. at 331 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (quoting Bank of Colum-
bia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819))).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94, 106. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), a regulatory takings case, the Court defined and limited real
property interests in a way that blurs many principled distinctions between real property and
entitlement based interests. Both types of interests are equally dependent upon "existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. at 2901 (quot-
ing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
205. Professor Norman Karlin elaborates on the Due Process Clause-Magna Carta
comparison:
Rights were owned by the people, as individuals, and never dichotomized into per-
sonal and property. It was to the contrary. The principle established by the Magna
Carta and thus basic to the common law and later to the Constitution was the identi-
fication of liberty and property. Ownership of property was evidence of liberty. In
solemn ceremony, it was there decreed that neither the King nor government could
take property except per legem terrae. The reach was not procedural but substantive.
Coke in his writings used the phrase interchangeably with "due process of law;" and,
in this form, the concept was included in the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Life, liberty and property comprised an invulnerable trilogy ....
Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627, 637-38
(1988) (footnotes omitted).
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late circuits insist that the substantive component of the Clause protects only
fundamental interests.2"l
B. A Function of Property?
In Ewing20 7 and Harrah,208 the Supreme Court did not further elaborate
on the source and nature of the due process rights it applied in each case.
The Court assumed that the mutual understanding between Ewing and the
university gave Ewing a property right in continued enrollment.2 °" Ewing's
subsequent dismissal presumably triggered the due process protection from
arbitrary decision making.210 In his concurrence, however, Justice Powell,
intimates that he would discriminate among property interests on the basis
of whether an asserted interest is "fundamental"'' and deny substantive
due process protection to interests that he considers less important.212 In
Ewing, the unanimous Court did not discuss whether Ewing's property right
was "fundamental," and instead centered the opinion on the latitude that
federal courts must accord academic board decisions.2 a The Court pro-
ceeded to the merits of the case, and decided that the school's action was not
arbitrary.214
In support of his position, Justice Powell cited to prior Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court carefully assessed the fundamental significance
of the asserted interest before according it substantive due process protec-
206. Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (6th Cir. 1990); Reich v. Beharry, 883
F.2d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1989); Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951, 957-58
(7th Cir. 1988).
207. Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). For a full discussion of
the case, see supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
208. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per curiam). For a full
discussion of the case, see supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
209. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 223.
210. Id.
211. Justice Powell opined that "[t]he interest asserted by [Ewing]-an interest in contin-
ued enrollment from which he derives a right to retake the [exam]-is essentially a state-law
contract right. It bears little resemblance to the fundamental interests that previously have
been viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution." Id. at 229-30 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
212. Id. at 229.
213. Id. at 225-27. In Harrah, however, the Court seemed to consider Justice Powell's
limiting criteria but did not apply it:
[T]here is no claim that the interest entitled to protection as a matter of substantive
due process was anything resembling "the individual's freedom of choice with respect
to certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life." Rather, respon-
dent's claim is simply that she, as a tenured teacher, cannot be discharged under the
School Board's purely prospective rule .... "
Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979) (citations omitted).
214. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227-28.
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tion.2  This fundamental interest inquiry, however, blurs the analysis, be-
cause the fundamental interest consideration applied by the Court in those
prior substantive due process cases was relevant to whether an interest con-
stituted a particularly important type of liberty interest 216 entitled to height-
ened judicial scrutiny.217 Ewing, on the other hand, sought review of
whether the deprivation of his property interest was arbitrary.218
C. The Problem with Property
Courts that adopt the fundamental rights approach as the watershed for
cognizability of the due process claim do so at the risk of permitting egre-
gious official abuses to go unredressed. The Third Circuit, in Reich v.
Beharry,21 9 expressed serious doubts about the entitlement-based interest as-
serted as property by Reich. 220 The panel characterized it as only an interest
in receiving his compensation without the delay caused by litigation for
breach of contract. 22 1 The Reich panel assumed that Reich's interest consti-
tuted property, but held that Reich's interest was an insignificant one that
falls outside the limits of substantive due process protection that Justice
Powell advocates.
222
Given the nature of the government action at issue, the denial of Reich's
substantive due process claim appears unjust when based solely on the "in-
significance" of the property interest. Reich's property deprivation was al-
legedly motivated by the malicious, spiteful vengeance of a government
215. Justice Powell cites to Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
216. See Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 106, at 438-39. Professors Bodensteiner and
Levinson compared the "arbitrary and capricious" standard utilized by the Court in Ewing
with Seventh Circuit cases that limited substantive due process claims to conduct that
"shocked the conscience" of the court. Id.
217. One commentator argues that the Ewing Court was applying a heightened form of
scrutiny by inquiring whether the university's decision to dismiss Ewing was "such a substan-
tial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exer-
cise professional judgment." Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental
Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After
Kadramas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1092 (1989) (quoting
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227). But see JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, § 10.6, at 341 n.3 (4th ed. 1991) (characterizing the standard in Ewing as highly
deferential to the university).
218. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 223.
219. 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989).
220. Id. at 242.
221. Id. at 245.
222. Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit might
argue that such a contract expectation cannot constitute property, where the only remedy the
state provides is a post-breach action for damages. Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435,
1449-50 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd, 466 U.S. 377 (1984).
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official with broad discretionary authority-precisely the sort of governmen-
tal abuse of power that the Clause is intended to reach.223 Where such abu-
sive action is manifest, the significance of the property interest then seems an
inadequate barometer for determining the cognizability of the due process
claim.224
D. Evaluating the Government Action
In an effort to place reasonable limits on the use of substantive due process
for deprivations of protected interests, the Supreme Court and some circuit
courts have given significant, if not controlling weight, to the nature of the
governmental action. In Rochin v. California,225 the Supreme Court re-
viewed a procedure whereby the police forced a criminal suspect to undergo
a stomach pumping to determine whether the suspect had swallowed illegal
drugs. The Supreme Court held that the police conduct "shocked the con-
science" 226 and thus violated "substantive due process., 227  Although
Rochin involved a liberty interest in being free from bodily intrusions,
228
several circuit courts use some form of the Rochin standard when analyzing
substantive due process claims for property deprivations.229 The Eighth Cir-
cuit explicitly adopts the Rochin language in considering the recognition of
novel claims. 2 0 The District of Columbia Circuit requires plaintiffs to show
"grave unfairness."23' The Ninth Circuit considers, among other factors,
223. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
224. However, "the nature of the interest affected is critical in analyzing the rationality of
the government's conduct." Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 106, at 438-39.
225. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
226. Id. at 172.
227. Id.
228. See TRIBE, supra note 34, § 11-3, at 775.
229. Although the Court has not overruled Rochin, the Court would most likely analyze
the conduct in Rochin under the incorporated Fourth Amendment (freedom from unreasona-
ble search and seizure) or Eighth Amendment (freedom from cruel and unusual punishment),
rather than under "substantive due process" analysis. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-
94 (1989). Prior to Graham, an alternative test used for excessive force claims was articulated
by the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973):
[Consider] the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Id. For the proposition that the Rochin standard should be adapted for application to all
substantive due process claims, see Wells & Eaton, supra note 27, at 226-28.
230. See Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989). The Weimer court added
that the conduct must be "offensive to human dignity." Id.
231. See Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956
(1988). In this zoning case, the Silverman court held that, "[o]nly a substantial infringement
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whether the government action was taken "for the purpose of causing
harm.
232
The nature of the government's action is the consideration that goes di-
rectly to the arbitrary and capricious "touchstone" of due process.233 The
aforementioned "shocks the conscience" and "grave unfairness" tests, while
perhaps providing a sure indicator of when due process is violated, are too
stringent when compared to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard234 used
by the Supreme Court in Harrah2 5 and Ewing.236
E. The Parratt Rule and Post-deprivation Remedies
The Parratt rule addresses government action. Parratt, in a nutshell,
means that "random and unauthorized" government action can vitiate the
requirement of pre-deprivation process,231 thus permitting an adequate post-
deprivation remedy at state law to satisfy due process.238 If Parratt similarly
governs due process claims for arbitrary deprivations, the rationale might be
found in the rule itself.
1. Random and Unauthorized Acts
Perhaps the question whether Parratt can bar a substantive due process
claim is contingent upon whether "random and unauthorized" government
action can constitute "arbitrary and capricious" use of government
power.231 "Random and unauthorized" conduct, for the purposes of Par-
ratt, defies easy definition. Clearly, in Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Co. of
Illinois,2" ° the sheriff was not "authorized" to auction property attached by
of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or a deliberate flouting of the law that
trammels significant personal or property rights, qualifies for relief under § 1983." Id.
232. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1409 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). The Ninth Circuit adapted the Johnson four-part
test to substantive due process claims generally. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
234. The Court's use of the "shocks the conscience" standard implies not mere arbitrari-
ness, but reprehensible abuse. William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law
Torts: A Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 529
(1989).
235. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198-99 (1979) (per curiam).
236. Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985).
237. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981). See supra notes 45-50 and accompa-
nying text.
238. See supra note 50.
239. See Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 718 (5th Cir. 1987). See infra note
253 and accompanying text.
240. 852 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1988).
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a writ invalidated three months before the auction.24' In Schaper v. City of
Huntsville,24 2 a biased decision-maker was a "random occurrence." How-
ever, the Supreme Court defines "random and unauthorized" differently.
The Court has determined that a "state official ... acting pursuant to any
established state procedure" does not constitute random action. 243 Under
such a procedure, "[a]ny erroneous deprivation will occur, if at all, at a spe-
cific, predictable point in the... process. ' 2 4 4 The Court has further defined
"unauthorized" conduct. Though it loosely describes conduct not sanc-
tioned by state law,245 the term does not apply to a "depriv[ation] of consti-
tutional rights ... by an official's abuse of his position. "246 Thus, although it
is assumed that the state does not authorize one in a position of delegated
power to exercise that power in an abusive fashion, the state's grant of power
precludes a finding that the action was "unauthorized;, 247 such an official is
in a position to provide or follow procedural safeguards. 248 Accordingly,
where a state actor is empowered to effect the deprivation, it is no answer
that he or she did so in a manner inconsistent with the state's grant of
power.249
241. The Kauth court did not inquire whether the deprivation was random or unauthor-
ized. See supra note 193.
242. 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987).
243. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 130 (1990).
244. Id. at 136.
245. Id. at 138.
246. Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). The Zinermon court
reasoned:
[P]etitioners cannot characterize their conduct as "unauthorized" in the sense the
term is used in Parratt and Hudson. The State delegated to them the power and
authority to effect the very deprivation complained of here.., and also delegated to
them the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set up by state law
.... In Parratt and Hudson, the state employees had no similar broad authority to
deprive prisoners of their personal property, and no similar duty to initiate.., the
procedural safeguards required before deprivations occur.
Id.
247. The Court carefully distinguished between delegated power and acts by unempowered
employees. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 135, 138.
248. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State
Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 18-19 (1991). See infra note
249.
249. In Home Tel. and Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), the Court
reasoned that when a state official "in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed
misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the [Fourteenth] Amendment, inquiry
concerning whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant" Id. at 287. Similarly, in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held that § 1983 reaches actions by "those
who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 171-72. Professors Tribe and Monaghan
read Parratt as a divergence from settled "state action" theory as set forth in the above quotes
from Home Telephone and Monroe. See TRIBE, supra note 34, § 10-14, at 730-31; Monaghan,
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Similarly, the due process prohibition against arbitrary and capricious
government action contemplates an official exercise of power.250 Thus,
where the abusive actor is a government official acting pursuant to a state
grant of power, the arbitrary and capricious claim may lie, irrespective of
whether the state officially sanctions the act.2 5' Conversely, one who is not
empowered by the state to affect property rights cannot be said to abuse
power not granted. Therefore, it appears that "random and unauthorized"
action, as defined in Parratt and more recently in Zinermon v. Burch,2 s2 can
never be colorable as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power.25 3
Under the foregoing definition of "random and unauthorized," and with
respect to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ewing, an official act that effects a
deprivation of property is colorable as a due process violation on two
grounds: (1) the state failed to canalize the exercise of official power with
adequate procedural safeguards, or (2) the official based the decision to de-
prive on arbitrary or other constitutionally impermissible considerations. To
view Parratt as a bright-line distinction between state-empowered officials
and other state employees254 is merely to recognize that a certain factual
scenario--a random, unauthorized act-evades inquiry into whether due
process accompanied the deprivation.255 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
supra note 27, at 994-95. Both urge this premise in cases where the state shields from liability
some "unauthorized" official acts that would otherwise constitute Fourteenth Amendment vi-
olations under Home Telephone and Monroe. The Court's opinion in Zinermon evidences an
attempt to wrestle the definition of "random and unauthorized" into an interpretation that
falls within the ambit of Home Telephone and Monroe, holding that the Parratt line of cases
[does] not stand for the proposition that in every case where a deprivation is caused
by an "unauthorized ... departure from established practices," state officials can
escape § 1983 liability simply because the State provides tort remedies. This reading
of Parratt and Hudson detaches those cases from their proper role as special applica-
tions of the settled principles expressed in Monroe and Mathews.
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138 n.20 (1990) (citation omitted). But see infra note 255.
250. See supra notes 77, 79. See also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1856) (explaining that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause is to prevent governmental power from being "used for purposes of oppression").
251. See TRIBE, supra note 34, § 3-25, at 177, n.25.
252. See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
253. See Monaghan, supra note 27, at 994. Professor Monaghan speculated that "'ran-
dom' [may be] a term of art, and Parratt collapses into little more than a distinction between
acts of 'lower echelon state employees... and high ranking officials.'" Id. (quoting Dwyer v.
Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1985)). With this hypothesis in mind he concluded, without
attempting to define "random and unauthorized," that a wholesale recognition of a substantive
due process claim for "arbitrariness" would effectively overrule Parratt. Monaghan, supra
note 27, at 994.
254. See supra notes 243-46, 253 and accompanying text.
255. Professor Oren is in accord with this reading of ParrattZinermon:
Parratt's "random and unauthorized" standard, therefore, focuses on different kind
of state authority than Monroe does. Zinermon teaches that where pre-deprivation
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holds the state constitutionally accountable for random, unauthorized depri-
vations256 by requiring due process in the form of an adequate post-depriva-
tion remedy at state law.
257
2. Constitutionally Adequate Post-deprivation Remedies
The Seventh Circuit panel in Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Co. of Illi-
nois258 did not rely on Parratt's random and unauthorized conduct distinc-
tion.259 Rather, the Kauth court held that the availability of an adequate
post-deprivation remedy precludes a finding that an arbitrary or capricious
deprivation violates due process. 2 1o The adequate post-deprivation remedy
inquiry in Parratt recognizes that the state can nonetheless provide due pro-
cess by affording make-whole relief for erroneous deprivations of prop-
erty.26' This suggests a different explanation for why Parratt might bar due
process claims for arbitrary deprivations.
Kauth's holding muddles Ewing's substance-procedure distinction.26 2
Under the Seventh Circuit's rule, the state can provide due process by af-
fording an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any abusive deprivations of
property that could constitute a due process violation under Ewing.2 63 In
process is practicable and state officials have the power to afford it, their acts are not
"random and unauthorized" .... This reasoning puts Parratt in its place, as a
special case that applies to unusual circumstances.
Oren, supra note 248, at 19.
256. Oren, supra note 248, at 22.
257. See supra note 50.
258. 852 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1988).
259. See supra note 193.
260. Kauth, 852 F.2d at 958.
261. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (holding that a post-deprivation tort
remedy at state law "could have fully compensated (Taylor] for the property loss he suffered").
See also Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d
565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (dismissing the due process claim because the
"plaintiff [was] entitled to be made whole for any loss of property occasioned by the unauthor-
ized conduct").
262. The court reasoned "that in cases where the plaintiff complains that he has been un-
reasonably deprived of a state-created property interest, without alleging.., that the available
state remedies are inadequate, the plaintiff has not stated a substantive due process claim."
Kauth, 852 F.2d at 958.
In Parratt, the Supreme Court collapsed the distinction more cryptically by holding only
that Taylor failed to allege "a violation of the Due Process Clause." Monaghan, supra note 27,
at 985-86. In so holding, the Parratt Court "abandon[ed] its prior discussion of due process in
a plainly procedural sense." Id.
263. The panel concluded:
Kauth does not dispute that availability of adequacy of the tort remedies that he
could have pursued in an Illinois state court. Therefore, because Kauth's complaint
alleges only a due process violation and does not allege that the defendants violated
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Kauth, the Seventh Circuit derives from Parratt's rationale a requirement
that the plaintiff either pursue such a remedy or allege the inadequacy of said
remedy, even where the court found no random or unauthorized conduct.
2 64
By requiring pursuit of a state remedy, the Seventh Circuit applies Parratt as
a general exhaustion-of-remedies requirement.265 Such an exhaustion re-
quirement has no basis in the language or interpretation of § 1983.266 The
Seventh Circuit's alternative-that the plaintiff allege the inadequacy of the
state remedy-applies Parratt as a "ripeness" requirement 267 by refusing to
recognize a colorable due process claim until the state's system fails to rem-
edy the arbitrary deprivation. 26 However, such a ripeness requirement ap-
parently contradicts settled § 1983 precedent. 26 '9  Further, many state-
created interests constitute property only because the state courts will en-
force the substantive limitations on power that form the basis of the entitle-
any other substantive provision of the Constitution, we must leave Kauth to his state
remedies.
Kauth 852 F.2d at 958.
264. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
265. See Monaghan, supra note 27, at 988-89 (discussing how the Parratt Court wrote in
terms of exhaustion).
266. "Section 1983... specifies no exhaustion requirement." Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist.,
491 U.S. 701, 748 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). And the Court has not, with few excep-
tions, required § 1983 plaintiffs to pursue state administrative remedies. See Webb v. Board of
Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 247 & n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267. The Court in Zinermon used such words of "ripeness" in its discussion of procedural
due process. See infra text accompanying note 278.
268. Leonard Kreynin, Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can the Constitution
be a Font of Contract Law?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1113 (1990).
269. Applying the ripeness concept to all claims for arbitrary deprivations would upset the
established precedent in Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) and
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Although the Zinermon Court defined random and
unauthorized in a way that accommodates the state action doctrine formulated in those two
cases, see supra note 249, a wholesale application of ripeness concepts "contradicts the direct
holding of Monroe that state remedies 'need not be first sought and refused' before a federal
remedy is properly invoked." Kreynin, supra note 268, at 1113 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at
183). Professor Monaghan states more broadly that "[n]o authority supports use of ripeness
doctrine to bar federal jurisdiction of an otherwise sufficiently focused controversy simply be-
cause corrective state judicial process had not been invoked." Monaghan, supra note 27, at
989.
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ment.2 7' Therefore, a ripeness requirement denies immediate federal
jurisdiction over arbitrary or abusive deprivations of such interests.271
Kauth, however, can be explained in due process terms. Kauth does not
completely dissolve the substance-procedure distinction. Rather, Kauth sug-
gests that the distinction is illusory-that protection from arbitrary and ca-
pricious deprivations is the root function of due process, but that the reach
of due process is purely procedural.272
Under the Kauth model, due process requires the states to afford preven-
tive pre-deprivation safeguards whenever practicable.27 a Parratt recognizes
that under certain circumstances pre-deprivation process is impracticable-
random and unauthorized action is one such circumstance.274 Kauth ex-
tends Parratt's rationale to circumstances that can render ineffective even
the most stringent procedural safeguards-arbitrary abuse of power is such a
circumstance.275 In each case, the provision of additional pre-deprivation
procedures would not significantly decrease the likelihood of a wrongful dep-
rivation. 276 Thus, the only process a state can provide is a means for fully
compensating the person for the "substance" of the property illegally de-
270. One commentator expanded upon this irony:
If no right remediable in state courts exists, then no property interest is implicated
and no due process rights arise. If, on the other hand, a right remediable in state
court is found, then the state provides all the process that is constitutionally due.
The case that might succeed [in invoking § 1983 jurisdiction] would be the exceed-
ingly rare case in which the state explicitly provides a right without a remedy or in
which the remedy in state court is structurally deficient or discriminates against fed-
eral rights.
Kreynin, supra note 268, at 1114.
271. Id.
272. Professor Scanlon views this substance-procedure distinction as one of name and not
of nature, arguing that the "procedural" component of due process encompasses both the im-
plementation of pre-deprivation procedures that safeguard against errors and the provision of
post-deprivation appeals that remedy such errors. Scanlon, supra note 79, at 97-98.
273. See supra note 39.
274. See supra note 50.
275. The four dissenting justices in Zinermon argued forcefully that Parratt's definition of
random and unauthorized conduct should control such abuses. Justice O'Connor wrote that
"[t]he state actor so indifferent to guaranteed protections would be no more prevented from
working the deprivation by additional requirements than would the mail handler in Parratt or
the prison guard in Hudson." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 144 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
276. Justice O'Connor demonstrates how a Mathews analysis suggests a similar result for
arbitrary acts:
The allegedly wanton nature of the subversion of the state procedures underscores
why the State cannot in any relevant sense anticipate and meaningfully guard against
the random and unauthorized actions alleged in this case .... The Court's characteri-
zation omits [the government official's] alleged wrongful state of mind and thus the
nature and the source of the wrongful deprivation.
Id. at 142-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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prived. 2" A § 1983 plaintiff can then state a colorable due process claim
under Kauth only by alleging procedural inadequacy: either the pre-depriva-
tion procedures were inadequate to prevent the error or the post-deprivation
procedures were inadequate to remedy the error. The Supreme Court's dicta
in Zinermon then takes on a very traditional gloss: "The constitutional vio-
lation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs;
it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process.
27 8
V. COMMENT: TOWARD A MORE COHERENT STANDARD
If the Seventh Circuit is correct, what are the consequences? Clearly the
application of an assumed "substantive" due process right in Harrah and
Ewing should then be regarded as anomalous. The Harrah and Ewing
Courts did not inquire whether the state failed to provide due process, did
not afford fundamental status to the interest at stake, and only reviewed the
state's decision for arbitrariness.2 79 Also, Rochin's "shocks the conscience"
standard would be discarded.28 ° Whether official conduct "shocks the con-
science" or is merely arbitrary would be irrelevant if the Constitution re-
quires no further pre-deprivation process and the state remedy will fully
compensate the plaintiff.28 1 Cases like Euclid,2" 2 however, are unaffected.
Euclid involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance, not to an official's ac-
tion.2" 3 Where the government act is legislative in nature, such laws of gen-
eral application are tempered not by preventive procedures but by the "due
process" of the ballot box.
28 4
Kauth's analysis further elucidates Parratt. Although Kauth and Parratt
share the same due process rationale, random, unauthorized acts and arbi-
trary abuses of government power must be analyzed differently. The unpre-
dictability of random and unauthorized deprivations by unempowered state
277. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
278. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126.
279. See supra notes 92, 104 and accompanying text.
280. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
281. See supra notes 92, 104-05 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the conscience-
shocking bodily search in Rochin might be better characterized as a violation of the incorpo-
rated Fourth or Eighth Amendment rights that the Court finds fundamental. See supra note
229. Under Kauth, the availability of post-deprivation remedies are irrelevant where a funda-
mental right is affected. Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1988).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), goes unscathed for the same reason. Monroe involved a
§ 1983 action for a warrantless search, arrest and subsequent detention, and thus Monroe's
holding-that "state remedies need not be sought and refused"-is consistent with Kauth. Id.
at 183.
282. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
283. Id. at 384.
284. Scanlon, supra note 79, at 97, 101.
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employees renders pre-deprivation safeguards impossible to provide at all.2"'
Accordingly, Parratt completely negates the state's constitutional duty to
provide pre-deprivation process where the act is random and unau-
thorized.28 6
Arbitrary abuses of government power, however, are predictable because
the state itself delegated the official power to identifiable persons in particu-
lar situations.2 7 Thus, Kauth does not relieve the state of its constitutional
duty to implement pre-deprivation process. 211 Where an official flouts the
state's pre-deprivation procedures, the provision of further safeguards is pos-
sible but may be futile.289 Accordingly, a plaintiff alleging an arbitrary dep-
rivation under Kauth can still claim that the pre-deprivation process was
either required or inadequate, while under Parratt a plaintiff must concede
that the state cannot implement such procedures at all. If a court following
Kauth applies the Supreme Court's procedural due process test in Mathews
v. Eldridge,290 and determines that further pre-deprivation process is not
constitutionally required, then Parratt's post-deprivation remedy rationale
controls the rest of the analysis. 291 A post-deprivation procedure that can
fully compensate the plaintiff for the loss then provides all of the process
that's due.292
However, if Harrah and Ewing were correctly decided, then Parratt re-
tains its special application. Zinermon's limited definition of "random and
unauthorized acts" excludes official exercises of delegated power. Thus, the
Supreme Court has an option if it chooses to review another claim for an
arbitrary deprivation of state-created property interests. If the Court
chooses to rely on Zinermon's bright-line distinction between random, unau-
thorized acts and official exercises of power, then the Court might use Ewing
as a vehicle for holding that all arbitrary deprivations of property are colora-
ble as due process claims. Alternatively, the Court can adopt Kauth's exten-
sion of the Parratt rationale to arbitrary deprivations, thereby reserving
"substantive" due process as a doctrine for vindicating official abuses of
power that impinge on fundamental rights.
285. See supra note 50.
286. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129 (1990).
287. Oren, supra note 248, at 19.
288. Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1988). The Kauth court
dismissed the claim because Kauth failed to attack the adequacy of the state's procedures. Id.
289. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 144 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (remarking that further pro-
cedures would not have guarded against an official "indifferent to guaranteed protections").
290. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see supra note 39.
291. See supra note 50.
292. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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Several factors suggest that the present Court will choose the latter ap-
proach. First, Kauth is consistent with the Parratt Court's refusal to "make
of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed on
whatever systems may already be administered by the states. ' 293 Second,
the four dissenters in Zinernon v. Burch 294 define "random and unauthor-
ized" in a way that extends to arbitrary decision-making and abuses of
power. 295 The Court, however, should retain the majority's bright-line dis-
tinction between truly random and unauthorized acts and official departures
from established procedure. The Court's definition of "random and unau-
thorized" permits a dispositive determination under Mathews that the state
cannot provide pre-deprivation process. 296 Lastly and most importantly,
Kauth brings internal coherence to due process jurisprudence. Kauth shifts
the inquiry away from a subjective evaluation of the official act and focuses
on the objective adequacy of the state's procedures under Mathews. Irre-
spective of a court's characterization of the state actor, the ultimate constitu-
tional question is whether the state's procedures adequately promote the
goal of due process-the guarantee against arbitrary government.297
In cases where a plaintiff alleges a deprivation of a protected interest, the
due process inquiry under Kauth is both straightforward and settled. First,
a court must objectively analyze the circumstances surrounding the depriva-
tion in order to characterize the state action. Such an analysis reveals that
the act responsible for the deprivation was either an exercise of delegated
power or a random and unauthorized act.
Second, the court must apply the three-factor test of Mathews v. El-
dridge 298 to determine whether pre-deprivation process is required and, if so,
whether the process provided is constitutionally adequate. If a random and
unauthorized act makes the provision of pre-deprivation safeguards impossi-
293. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 666 (1981) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.693, 701
(1976)).
294. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
295. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Chief Justice and Associate Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy in Zinermon, which the Court decided prior to the departure of Associate Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall. Id. at 139. The dissent takes the majority to task for defining Parratt's
random and unauthorized acts exclusive of exercises of delegated power. Id. at 145. Justice
O'Connor used reasoning that would bring arbitrary abuses within the reach of Parratt: "Peti-
tioners' actions were unauthorized: they are alleged to have wrongly and without license de-
parted from established state practices.... [I]t is alleged that petitioners "with willful, wanton
and reckless disregard of and indifference to" Burch's rights contravened... established state
procedure." Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted).
296. See supra note 50.
297. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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ble, then analysis under Mathews results in a determination that such safe-
guards are not constitutionally required.299
Conversely, where an empowered official causes a deprivation, pre-depri-
vation process is always possible. Analysis under Mathews then enables a
court to determine whether the pre-deprivation process afforded is constitu-
tionally adequate, or that due process requires something more. Such an
analysis may, however, suggest that more process could not have prevented
the official malfeasance. However, a determination under Mathews that fur-
ther preventive process is both possible and practicable completes the due
process claim.
3 °
Conversely, a determination that such process is impossible, futile, or
otherwise not required shifts the inquiry to whether the state provides a pro-
cedure that can fully compensate the plaintiff for all provable losses. The
inquiry into the adequacy of the post-deprivation remedy involves a compar-
ison between the available state law compensatory remedies and the types of
compensation available to § 1983 plaintiffs.301
For example, if a plaintiff alleges that the deprivation caused emotional
distress but the relevant state tribunal is powerless to compensate plaintiffs
for such damages, the state remedy is constitutionally inadequate.3 °2 The
remedy is constitutionally inadequate because due process entitles a plaintiff
to such compensation under § 1983.303 Conversely, if the state's remedy en-
299. See supra note 50.
300. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138-39 (1990) (holding that the deprivation was
foreseeable, and thus, that further pre-deprivation process would not be impossible).
301. Kevin G. Chapman, Parratt v. Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Re-
quirement, 65 B.U. L. REv. 607 (1985). Courts must fully consider whether the state remedy
can fully compensate the plaintiff for any harm caused. Id. at 633. This "strict adequacy"
requirement may be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 635-37.
302. In a pre-Parratt case the Court held that "mental and emotional distress caused by the
denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983 ... with[] proof that some
injury was actually caused." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978).
303. See Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1983). Rutherford was
an action brought to recover taxes, and the plaintiff further alleged harassment by a govern-
ment official. Id. at 581. The district court held that the administrative remedies for recovery
of overpayments were constitutionally adequate. Id. at 582. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the remedies were not adequate:
The plaintiffs ask in recompense for the agent's abuses not a return of their taxes-
that remedy they sought in their associate proceeding against the government-but
damages for the grief the Agent is said to have caused .... The statutory machine
for refund make no allowance for mental anguish caused by harassment.
Id. at 584 (citation omitted). Rutherford was a Bivens action under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and not a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 582.
Bivens actions are § 1983-like constitutional claims brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which permits a constitutional cause of action
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titles the plaintiff to compensation for all provable losses, the state provides
all of the process that's due.
A necessary corollary derived from the above analysis is that the plaintiff
need not demonstrate that he or she could win in state court. Section 1983
plaintiffs need not demonstrate governmental arbitrariness or abuse to pre-
vail on a claim that the state violated due process.3" A plaintiff need only
show that the state failed to provide all of the process that's due.3"3
VI. CONCLUSION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individu-
als from deprivations of state-created interests effected by an arbitrary or
abusive exercise of governmental power. Neither the history of the Clause
nor Supreme Court precedent supports a proposition that a property interest
must have near fundamental import to trigger this protection. Indeed, pre-
cedent and history provide no alternative but that all property interests are
entitled to the due process protection from arbitrary government.
Whether a due process violation occurs, however, does not hinge upon
whether the state's use of power was reasonable or arbitrary. Rather, the
question is whether the state failed to provide due process. The question
entails only a test of the state procedures for constitutional adequacy. In-
quiry into the government action that effects the deprivation is then limited
to characterization of the government actor. Such a characterization pro-
vides the factual context for analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge.
The Supreme Court nonetheless holds that due process also bars "certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the procedures used to
implement them.'" Such actions, however, violate due process only if they
impinge on constitutionally-created rights. Such rights are those so impor-
tant that the Supreme Court ranks them as fundamental. Substantive review
of official acts under a "due process" rubric should be limited accordingly.
Craig W. Hillwig
against a federal agent. Chapman, supra note 301, at 632. Thus, the Rutherford court's rea-
soning mirrors that for a § 1983 claim. Id. at n.168.
304. Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous Court:
Our cases do not support ... [a] reading of § 1983 as requiring proof of an abuse of
governmental power separate and apart from the proof of a constitutional violation.
Although [§ 1983] provides the citizen with an effective remedy against those abuses
of state power that violate federal law, it does not provide a remedy for abuses that
do not violate federal law. More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinc-
tion between abusive and non-abusive federal violations.
Collins v. Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1065 (1992).
305. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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